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David Scheffert
We meet on this evening of October 14, 2005, only a few
days after the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
* Major portions of this speech, delivered at Pace University Law School on
October 14, 2005, were drawn from a similar address delivered by Ambassador
Scheffer at the Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International
Law-2005, held in The Hague, The Netherlands, on July 1, 2005, which will be
published by T.M.C. Asser Institute (The Hague). Parts of this speech are also
adopted from his address at the Georgetown University Law Center Symposium,
"The United States and International Law: Confronting Global Challenges,"
October 27, 2004, which was published in David Scheffer, Blueprint for Legal
Reforms at the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 683 (2005).
t David Scheffer is Visiting Professor at Northwestern University School of
Law (2005-2006) and the former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
(1997-2001). He led the U.S. delegation in United Nations' negotiations for the
establishment of the International Criminal Court, including the Rome Conference
of June-July 1998.
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Nations, Ambassador John Bolton, reportedly blocked a discus-
sion in the U.N. Security Council of the report on the situation
in Darfur, Sudan, by the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Ad-
viser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez. 1 Ambassa-
dor Bolton was reportedly joined by the Russian, Chinese, and
Algerian representatives, against the strong desires of the Sec-
retary-General and eleven other Member States of the Security
Council who wanted to invite Mr. Mendez into the Security
Council chamber to report on his recent trip to Darfur.2 One
can only hope that Ambassador Bolton's reasons for blocking
Mr. Mendez had nothing to do with the Special Adviser's criti-
cism of the Sudan for refusing to cooperate with the prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court"), Luis
Moreno Ocampo. He was carrying out the mandate of U.N. Se-
curity Council Resolution 1593, from which the United States
abstained when it was approved on March 31, 2005. Ambassa-
dor Bolton's reported reason for denying discussion was that the
Security Council needed action, not words, on Darfur.3 It was
yet another moment in recent years when the U.S., under cur-
rent management, demonstrated how seemingly intimidated it
is by the ICC, even by the Court's vital work in Africa today.
What pragmatic institutional reforms might be pursued in
coming years to bridge the gulf between the U.S. government
and the ICC, and strengthen that international institution in
the process? Bearing in mind that the forthcoming 2009 Review
Conference of the Rome Statute offers an opportunity for
amendments to the Rome Statute, there are also other initia-
tives that could be undertaken soon and which fall short of for-
mally amending the treaty.
The proposals set forth in this address are made from a per-
spective that is often misunderstood by some scholars, commen-
tators, and politicians who view U.S. policy as one long
continuum of opposition to the ICC. The Clinton Administra-
tion, for which I worked, strongly supported the establishment
of an international criminal court, and President Clinton called
for that goal to be met by the end of the twentieth century. Al-
though the U.S. objected to certain provisions of the final draft
1 Bolton Blocks a Briefing on Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A3.
2 Id.
3 Id.
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of the Rome Statute presented at the Rome Conference on July
17, 1998, we worked very hard, thereafter, in 1999 and 2000 to
address our remaining concerns about the Rome Statute. After
the U.S. delegation to the U.N. talks satisfied some of those con-
cerns in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements
of Crimes, it joined the consensus vote on them in June 2000.
Moreover, we obtained encouraging informal support from key
governments regarding further U.S. proposals for other supple-
mental documents that were scheduled for negotiation in 2001.
President Clinton authorized the signing of the Rome Statute
by the U.S. government on December 31, 2000.4 We thought, at
the time, that we were presenting the Bush Administration
with the strongest possible negotiating opportunity for 2001 as
a signatory state to the Rome Statute. However, the Bush Ad-
ministration abandoned the U.N. negotiations and, in May
2002, sent a letter to the United Nations effectively nullifying
the U.S. signature on the treaty.5 The American Service Mem-
bers Protection Act of 2002,6 which the Clinton Administration
had vigorously opposed when it was first introduced in the sum-
mer of 2000, was adopted with strong Bush Administration sup-
port. In recent years, an aggressive campaign, led by John
Bolton, to compel other governments to sign purported Article
98(2) non-surrender agreements with Washington has widened
the gulf between the United States and the ICC, as well as cer-
tain foreign governments. 7 A largely destructive American re-
lationship with the ICC has only added to the overall tension
between the Bush Administration and many international trea-
ties and institutions. Nonetheless, the American abstention
from the vote for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593, a mini-
malist tactic that I and others had been urging since early 2004
in order to bring the United States on board, permitted the re-
ferral of the Darfur situation to the ICC. This may have sig-
4 Clinton's Words: "The Right Action," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6.
5 See Press Statement, International Criminal Court: Letter to U.N. Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002) http://www.state.gov/ripa/prs/ps/2002/
9968.htm.
6 American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433
(West 2002). In December 2004, President Bush signed the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which contained the
Nethercutt Amendment, PL 108-447 2004 HR 4818. The Amendment authorizes
the withholding of economic aid to countries that have ratified the ICC treaty.
7 See Press Statement, supra note 5.
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naled a slight shift in policy and is one that should be nurtured
carefully by other governments interested in U.S. engagement.
I believe strongly in a constructive U.S. relationship with
the ICC; primarily, one that may ultimately lead to the repeal of
the non-cooperation provisions of the American Service Mem-
bers Protection Act, and to an American posture that is not so
fearful of, or intimidated by, the workings of the ICC. I will
argue that there are several possible reform initiatives that
would have a profound effect on the viability of the ICC and of
America's role in its future development.
A great deal of America's standing and effectiveness at the
United Nations flows from its commitment, or lack thereof, to
broadly accepted international treaty regimes. This is particu-
larly true of the permanent ICC. Often overlooked in the Amer-
ican debate about the ICC is the simple reality that the effective
and fair operation of the ICC can go a long way towards dispel-
ling concerns over whether it will seek to influence, using inves-
tigation and indictment tactics, the foreign policy choices of
major military powers, particularly against newly emerging
threats. The U.N. Security Council could play a very construc-
tive role, assuming the United States has the wisdom to permit
such action. There are several initiatives, some involving the
Security Council and others engaging other bodies that could be
undertaken so as to diminish U.S. government concerns about
the ICC and strengthen its relevancy and efficiency.
I. NON-AMENDMENT REFORMS
The first category of reforms is one that would not require
any amendment to the Rome Statute, but which involves
amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.8 These
are proposals that could be acted upon within a short period of
time, provided the necessary diplomatic initiatives and political
will exist.
8 See Assembly of States Parties Report of the Rome Statute of the ICC, 1st
Sess., Sept. 3-10, 2002, Part II. A., ICC-ASP/1/3, http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/lst-
session/report/first report contents.htm.
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A. Article 98(2) Agreements
In the May 2005 issue of the Journal of International Crim-
inal Justice, I presented what I firmly believe is the proper in-
terpretation of Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. This
interpretation is at odds with the Bush Administration's read-
ing of Article 98(2), as well as the Administration's implementa-
tion of it through the signing of one hundred flawed bilateral
non-surrender agreements with foreign governments. 9 In
short, Article 98(2) only covers those agreements of bilateral or
multilateral character between or among nations, whether
party or non-party to the Rome Statute and/or international or-
ganizations, such as the ICC or the United Nations, that pro-
vide for non-surrender to the ICC of a nation's military or
official personnel and related civilian component sent abroad on
official mission by such nation.10 The agreements were not in-
tended to cover individuals acting abroad in a private capacity
or independently for foreign government or international organ-
ization purposes. The bilateral non-surrender agreements ne-
gotiated by the current U.S. administration are intended to
cover not only current or former government officials, govern-
ment employees, including contractors, and military personnel,
but also all U.S. nationals, including those acting in a strictly
private or non-U.S. capacity. For example, businessmen, inter-
national civil servants, non-governmental organization staffers,
tourists, journalists, and mercenaries would be covered under
the Article. Primarily ICC judges, not the U.S. government or
its treaty partners or anyone else, are left to interpret the appli-
cation of these bilateral non-surrender agreements under Arti-
cle 98(2) of the Rome Statute. If the interpretations are flawed,
their enforceability before the Court will be, to say the least,
problematic.
How can a solution emerge from this unnecessary mess?
I propose that existing bilateral non-surrender agreements be
rectified with a U.S. public declaration confirming that the ref-
erence to "nationals" in such agreements will be interpreted by
the U.S. government to mean the U.S. civilian component of a
9 See David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original
Intent, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 333 (2005).
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
9 (July 17, 1998), http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm.
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military deployment. New or amended agreements negotiated
by the United States with foreign governments should limit
the scope of application to official and military personnel of the
"sending State," and to cover them for actions they undertook in
their official capacity. Thus, former officials and personnel
would be covered for actions they took while in the service of the
sending State, such as the United States. Private contractors
may qualify for coverage only to the extent that they could be
described as persons of the sending State, are directly con-
tracted by the U.S. government to undertake duties in the for-
eign jurisdiction in connection with an official mission, and are
held accountable (including criminal responsibility) before U.S.
courts for their performance. But, in order to ensure that impu-
nity for atrocity crimes would not be the end result of the bilat-
eral agreement, the sending State should commit itself in the
Article 98(2) agreement to full investigation and, if warranted,
prosecution of persons of the sending State who are suspected of
committing such crimes, particularly if arrest warrants against
such persons have been issued by the ICC. The European
Union has sought (so far without success) a similar assurance
as a pre-condition to any of its members entering into an Article
98(2) agreement with the United States. Such a provision
would greatly facilitate a State Party's compliance with the Ar-
ticle 98(2) agreement by permitting it to point to an effective
exercise of complementarity by the sending State.
The Bush Administration also should issue a declaration
that designates as Article 98(2) agreements all U.S. Status of
Forces Agreements ("SOFAs") and Status of Mission Agree-
ments ("SOMAs") covering U.S. personnel, to the extent that
their terms (which can vary) require criminal jurisdiction to be
allocated in a specific manner between the parties to such
agreements, and such criminal jurisdiction covers the atrocity
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The bottom line of
such a declaration must be that a suspect of an atrocity crime
will be investigated and, if merited, prosecuted before a compe-
tent court of law pursuant to the procedures of the SOFA or
SOMA. Such a presidential declaration would not be regarded
as credible if it sought to shield individuals from any investiga-
tion whatsoever of atrocity crimes by simply designating SOFAs
and SOMAs as Article 98(2) agreements.
[Vol. 17:161
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This "fix" for the Article 98(2) non-surrender agreements
would strengthen their enforceability and encourage European
Union governments in particular to consider signing such
agreements with the United States. While many would regard
this as an imperfect procedure undermining the reach of the
ICC's jurisdiction, it would provide a wide range of enforceable
non-surrender protection for U.S. official and military person-
nel (active and retired) and hence diminish American concerns
about the Court's future intentions. That can be an important
contribution to a fresh overall policy of U.S. engagement with
the ICC in coming years.
B. Temporal Jurisdiction
It is probably heresy to most international lawyers engaged
with the study and practice of the ICC to suggest that within
the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC lies a simple formula for
resolving the concerns of non-party States which, if ignored,
would lead to efforts to prohibit national cooperation with the
Court (witness the American Service Members Protection Act)
and to inhibit some major countries from joining the ICC due to
the exposure of their nationals while in non-party status. Such
a contingency is politically unacceptable. A misinterpretation
of the Court's temporal jurisdiction poisons the well for signa-
ture and ratification of the Rome Statute by governments whose
participation could prove so important to the universal applica-
tion of the Rome Statute.
I will not recite here my interpretation of Articles 126(2),
11(2), 121(5), 24, 22(1), 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute that
leads me to conclude that the temporal jurisdiction of the Court
commences for the nationals of a non-party State on the date
sixty days following the filing of that State's instrument of rati-
fication, pursuant to Article 126(2) (except under circumstances
of U.N. Security Council referral or State consent).11 Suffice it
to say here that so many complex formulas for reform of the ICC
in order to address U.S. concerns and the concerns of other ma-
jor nations such as India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Russia, Pa-
kistan, and Egypt would be simplified with a proper interpreta-
11 For discussion of this interpretation see David Scheffer, How to Turn the
Tide Using the Rome Statute's Temporal Jurisdiction, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 26
(2004).
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tion of the Rome Statute and its jurisdictional reach over non-
party nationals. An honest appreciation of the ICC's temporal
jurisdiction would create robust political dynamics to fully em-
power the Court to investigate the most serious atrocity crimes
and their perpetrators.
For example, in exchange for an agreed interpretation of
the Rome Statute of this character, the permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council 12 could inform the Assembly of
States Parties that where circumstances become compelling
enough to require that the ICC have jurisdiction over non-party
State nationals, due to such State's (or such individual's partic-
ular) threat to international peace and security giving rise to
alleged violations of ICC crimes, they would act as speedily and
as favorably as possible to approve a U.N. Charter Chapter VII
enforcement resolution that refers the situation to the ICC and
thus eliminates any doubts about the ICC's jurisdiction over the
suspects. The recent referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC
is encouraging in this respect. While the accomplishment of
such a temporal jurisdiction initiative would require considera-
ble diplomacy, the benefit of doing so in accordance with a cor-
rect interpretation of the ICC's temporal jurisdiction would
liberate the United States, China, Russia, and other major
states to cooperate with, support, and join the ICC far sooner
and with a greater sense of integrity. The taint of what many of
their respective officials regard, rightly or wrongly, as an ultra
vires court would be removed. Such an initiative would achieve
the jurisdiction of the ICC over the nationals of such major
states more effectively and expeditiously than will reliance on a
popular but illogical application of temporal jurisdiction.
The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC could adopt an
interpretation of the Court's temporal jurisdiction as an amend-
ment to the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence that would
dispel concerns by existing non-party States seeking greater
certainty of interpretation about the full reach of the Court's
overall jurisdiction (including personal, subject matter, territo-
rial, and temporal jurisdiction). This could be a relatively pain-
less procedure by the Assembly of States Parties that would
12 The U.N. Security Council consists of three non-party States to the Rome
Statute - the United States, China, and Russia, and two Assembly of State Parties
- France and the United Kingdom.
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vastly improve cooperation and participation in the treaty re-
gime by major world powers which remain non-party States in
significant part because of continued confusion over the ICC's
temporal jurisdiction.
C. Amendments to U.S. Federal Criminal and Military Law
Ironically, many of the states that have ratified the Rome
Statute and enacted legislation that modernizes their criminal,
and in some cases, military codes and aligns them with the
crimes of the Rome Statute are now more insulated from the
jurisdiction of the ICC than is the United States as a non-party
State. That is because the U.S. federal criminal and military
codes are out-dated and demonstrate fundamental gaps be-
tween U.S. law and the atrocity law falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC. If those gaps could be filled with amendments
to U.S. Code Title 18 (criminal) and Title 10 (military), then the
United States would be far better positioned to exercise comple-
mentarity with the ICC than is currently the case. Improving
the complementarity rights of the United States would be a sig-
nificant confidence-building step for U.S. officials and scholars
concerned about the ICC's review of U.S. investigations and
prosecutions. That exercise in modernizing Titles 10 and 18 of
the U.S. Code and aligning U.S. law with Articles 5-8 of the
Rome Statute is far too detailed to relay in a discussion of this
character. But the objective deserves some explanation because
this exercise alone would greatly ease concern in the United
States about whether the exercise of complementarity in fact
would be the safeguard from ICC prosecution of American sus-
pects that it purports to be. I want to provide a preview of what
might be possible before the U.S. Congress.
First, there is a wealth of experience now recorded in other
major jurisdictions, including the ICC implementing legislation
in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and Austra-
lia, that can assist with a modernizing exercise in the United
States. So there is much to draw upon regarding how the
crimes of the ICC have been incorporated in other national legal
systems.
Title 18 of the U.S. Code does not codify crimes against hu-
manity as such. The combined definitional and juridical ele-
ments required for a crime against humanity in the Rome
20051
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Statute and Elements of Crimes simply do not exist in U.S. fed-
eral law, and some of the Rome Statute's crimes against hu-
manity-such as the crime of apartheid or the crime of
extermination or of persecution-do not exist as such in the fed-
eral criminal code. Title 18 should be amended to ensure that
the full range of crimes against humanity and their constituent
elements, including the requirement that the individual crime
be committed as part of "a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against any civilian population," 13 are properly recited
therein. The federal genocide statute does not permit prosecu-
tion of an alien for genocide committed outside U.S. territory,
even if the alien is a resident of or otherwise present in the
United States. 14 Title 18 should be amended to enable such
prosecution in U.S. courts. The federal war crimes statute re-
quires a broader jurisdiction to include perpetrators or victims
who are not necessarily U.S. nationals or members of the U.S.
military, including perhaps the opportunity whereby if the al-
leged alien perpetrator is present on U.S. territory, then he or
she can be prosecuted. 15 If the alien victim of the war crime is
on U.S. territory, he or she could not seek relief unless the al-
leged alien perpetrator also appears on U.S. territory. Further,
the federal war crimes statute should be amended to include the
war crimes under international customary law that are re-
flected in Article 8 of the Rome Statute-only some of which are
covered by the existing federal law.
Equally compelling gaps exist in Title 10 of the U.S. Code,
which includes the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A whole-
sale review of Title 10 is necessary to ensure that the U.S. mili-
tary is fully capable of investigating genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes as those crimes are defined in the
Rome Statute and its related Elements of Crimes.
13 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998)(Article 7).
14 18 U.S.C. §1091 (1994).
15 18 U.S.C. §2441 (1996).
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D. Double Complementarity16
The ICC Assembly of States Parties also could amend the
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence so as to implement a pro-
cedure of double complementarity, namely a procedure that
would ensure the initial transfer of ICC suspects to their na-
tional jurisdictions that are willing to investigate and, if mer-
ited, prosecute them under the complementarity procedures of
the Rome Statute. Governments need to be assured, through
the procedural workings of the ICC, that a claim of national ju-
risdiction over an individual properly invokes the complemen-
tarity privileges of Article 18 of the Rome Statute. Under
Article 18 of the Rome Statute, investigation and prosecution of
individuals within its jurisdiction should entail the following:
Where a State Party to the ICC decides not to investigate or
prosecute an individual who is subject to its national jurisdic-
tion for commission of an ICC crime, that State Party shall
agree to transfer the individual to a requesting government (re-
gardless of whether it is a State Party to the ICC) that properly
invokes the complementarity privileges of Article 18 of the
Rome Statute with the intention of investigating and, if mer-
ited, prosecuting the individual in its national courts for the
ICC crime(s) in question.
Such procedural complementarity, incorporated in the ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and ensuring the transfer of
the individual to, in most cases, his or her own national jurisdic-
tion, would assure all governments that their implementation
of substantive complementarity before national courts will be
achievable. For example, in the event a non-party State fails to
follow through with credible investigation and prosecution of an
individual transferred to its jurisdiction and then fails (as
would be its right as a non-party State) to heed the ICC's re-
quest to voluntarily transfer such individual to the ICC, the
new rule could provide for termination of any State Party's obli-
gation to transfer anyone to that non-party State as part of any
implementation of Article 18 of the Rome Statute and the new
double complementarity procedure. In contrast, a State Party
that invokes Article 18 of the Rome Statute and achieves cus-
16 The following subsection appeared in David Scheffer, Blueprint for Legal
Reforms at the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 683, 698 (2005).
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tody of a suspect would be required to transfer such individual
within its custody to the ICC in accordance with Articles 89 and
90 of the Rome Statute in the event complementarity fails and
the ICC requests the transfer.
E. Strengthened Admissibility Review
During the negotiations of 2000, which concerned supple-
mental documentation to the Rome Statute, the U.S. delegation
developed a proposal that gained considerable informal support
among other governments. The proposal was to ensure thatjust prior to any surrender of a suspect to the ICC, there would
be a review of the admissibility of the case by the judges, using
their Article 19(1) power to initiate such a review. 17 This would
ensure that if there were developments in a national court sys-
tem between the time when the suspect was first identified by
the ICC and the time of a surrender request by the Court, the
judges would take those developments into account to deter-
mine whether that national jurisdiction had fulfilled its comple-
mentarity responsibilities. For the United States, such a
procedure, established by amendment to the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, would provide much greater assurance that good
faith efforts of investigation and, if merited, prosecution of a
suspect in U.S. courts following any Article 18 procedure of
complementarity and prior to actual surrender to the Court
would be honored by the ICC judges as a consequence of this
Article 19(1) admissibility review on the eve of surrender.' 8
This strengthened admissibility review could be estab-
lished by amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence with
wording of the following character:
Unless there has been a referral to the Court pursuant to article
13(b) of the Statute, the Court shall determine on its own motion
pursuant to article 19(1) the admissibility of a case in accordance
with article 17 when there is a request for the surrender of a sus-
17 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998)(Article 19(1)).
18 See David Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 47, 59-60, 80, 96 (2001-2002).
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pect who is charged in such case with a crime that occurred
outside the territory of the suspect's State of nationality. 19
F. Security Council Referral to the ICC
Rome Statute Article 13(b) invites the Security Council to
refer atrocity situations to the ICC for investigation and prose-
cution, and that referral power can be executed on terms set
forth in the relevant Council resolution.20 Such application of
the Security Council's referral power should enable the Security
Council, using its U.N. Charter Chapter VII enforcement au-
thority, to limit or qualify the personal, subject matter, territo-
rial, or temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, as well as the scope of
complementarity, with respect to the specific situation being re-
ferred to the Court. Simultaneously, the Security Council's in-
vocation of Chapter VII authority can enhance greatly the
powers of investigation of the Court and broaden the Court's
reach over designated non-party States to the ICC and the na-
tionals of such non-party States. These measures of control
over the scope of the ICC's investigative and ultimately
prosecutorial powers in atrocity situations referred by the Se-
curity Council should be recognized by the U.S. government and
other permanent members of the Council as remarkable oppor-
tunities to use accountability under international criminal law
in the most constructive possible way to help maintain or re-
store international peace and security.
Security Council Resolution 1593, which referred the Dar-
fur situation to the ICC, reflects some of what the Council can
accomplish in this situation. 21 The resolution includes an ex-
plicit exemption from the ICC's jurisdiction, stating that
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contrib-
uting State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts
or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan es-
19 The origin for this proposed language can be found in the U.S. proposal for
the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the ICC recited in
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17 (2000).
20 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998)(Article 13(b)).
21 S.C. Res. 1593, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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tablished or authorized by the Council or the African Union, un-
less such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing State.22
While this exemption from the jurisdiction of the ICC was an
unattractive feature of the resolution in the eyes of many Court
supporters, including myself, it does demonstrate that the
United States can ensure adequate safeguards for its own per-
sonnel through a Security Council referral in order to achieve
the objective of bringing foreign perpetrators of atrocities occur-
ring outside the United States to justice.
G. The Security Council's Power to Block the ICC
Rome Statute Article 16 empowers the Security Council to
block the ICC from acting during particularly sensitive security
challenges with much calibrated use of the Council's enforce-
ment power under the U.N. Charter.23 This power of blockage
is likely a very potent instrument of leverage on the ICC by the
Security Council. Even the threat of a Security Council resolu-
tion invoking Article 16 authority could deeply influence the
choices made by the ICC Prosecutor while exercising his pow-
ers. The United States already has toyed with Article 16 in
achieving adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002)
and 1487 (2003), albeit for purposes never intended by the nego-
tiators of the ICC. If the United States turned its attention to a
more constructive use of Article 16 in the future, using it spar-
ingly and for persuasive purpose in agreement with other mem-
bers of the Security Council with respect to particular
situations, then it could become a safeguard of considerable
utility.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE ROME STATUTE
A. Amendment to Make the Crime of Aggression Actionable24
There remains a high probability that an effort will be
made at the 2009 Review Conference of the Rome Statute to
amend the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court so as to es-
22 Id.
23 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998)(Article 16).
24 The following subsection also appeared in Scheffer, supra note 16, at 699.
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tablish a trigger mechanism and definition for the crime of ag-
gression, and thus to make it an actionable crime before the
Court. It would be a folly for the United States to remain disen-
gaged in the on-going negotiations by the Assembly of States
Parties over how, for purposes of individual criminal responsi-
bility, the crime of aggression will be enforced by the ICC.
(Even as a non-party State, the United States can participate as
an observer in such negotiations.)
If there is any ICC crime that might be used for political
purposes against the United States in the future, it will be the
crime of aggression due to America's global military commit-
ments and often bold and controversial use of its armed forces
on or over foreign territory. A proper trigger procedure and def-
inition for the crime of aggression would dispel concerns that
the ICC might be manipulated by governments or the ICC pros-
ecutor to thwart legitimate uses of military force to confront
threats to international peace and security. As a no-show in the
negotiations, the United States may have only itself to blame if
the trigger mechanism and definition of the crime of aggression
that emerge for consideration at the 2009 Review Conference
prove unacceptable.
B. Amendment to the Rome Statute to Criminalize U.N.
Corruption and Sexual Abuse
25
In addition to the crime of aggression, crimes of terrorism
and drug trafficking are expected to be seriously considered for
amendment to the Rome Statute at the 2009 Review Confer-
ence. While these initiatives may be all the review conference
can absorb regarding the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, ef-
fort should be made to consider using the ICC to investigate and
prosecute officials charged with the most egregious types of cor-
ruption and sexual abuse within the U.N. system, including its
specialized agencies, related organizations, and peace opera-
tions. In light of the recent investigation into the Oil-for-Food
Program for Iraq26 and sexual abuse investigations of the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the
25 Id. at 700.
26 See Chairman of the Independent Inquiry Committee, The Management of
the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program (Sept. 7, 2005), http://www.iic.offp.org/
MgmtReport.htm.
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Congo,27 there is a strong case to be made that the United Na-
tions needs access to an independent criminal court before
which U.N. administrators charged with corruption or U.N.
peacekeeping personnel charged with sexual assault may be
brought. The requirements of sufficient gravity and importance
to the international community that limit the range of crimes
already in the Rome Statute also would need to be retained in
some fashion for these additional categories of crimes. Other-
wise, the ICC would be overwhelmed with investigating and
prosecuting relatively low-level individuals for relatively low-
impact crimes. Some criteria for the targets of investigation
and the magnitude of the crimes at issue would have to be es-
tablished. Given Washington's investigative focus on both U.N.
corruption and peacekeeping and sexual abuse, the U.S. govern-
ment should find such subject matter jurisdiction an attractive
feature of the ICC worth cooperating with and in which partici-
pation may be valuable.
III. DECLARATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND PROVISO TO A U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE
If some of the reform initiatives introduced above can be
realized, and the United States achieves the political will to rat-
ify or accede to the Rome Statute, then it is entirely predictable
that the U.S. Senate will push as close as possible to the cliff of
reservations not permitted under the Rome Statute in order to
assure the sufficient two-thirds vote required in that body for
approval of a treaty. Various governments that already have
ratified the Rome Statute have employed declarations and un-
derstandings of occasional bold character. One can easily imag-
ine what the United States might draw upon to frame its own
declarations, understandings, and proviso. For example, Aus-
tralia confirmed a far-reaching declaration regarding comple-
mentarity, requiring that "no person will be surrendered to the
Court by Australia until it has had the full opportunity to inves-
tigate or prosecute any alleged "crimes.""28 For this purpose,
27 The Secretary-General, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sex-
ual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, delivered
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 4, 2005).28 Australia Declaration, C.N. 706.2002, July 1, 2002, http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/CNs/2002/701_800/706E.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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the procedure under Australian law supplementing the Statute
of the Court provides that no person can be surrendered to the
Court unless the Australian Attorney-General issues a certifi-
cate allowing surrender. Australian law also provides that "no
person can be arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by
the Court without a certificate from the Attorney General."
29
The Australian declaration further states "its understanding
that the offences in Articles 6, 7 and 8 will be interpreted and
applied in a way that accords with the way they are imple-
mented in Australian domestic law."30
Colombia included in its declaration the requirement that,
"[cloncerning Article 17(3), Colombia declares that the use of
the word 'otherwise' with respect to the determination of the
State's ability to investigate or prosecute a case refers to the
obvious absence of objective conditions necessary to conduct the
trial."31 Colombia's declaration further requires that "none of
the provisions of the Rome Statute alter the domestic law ap-
plied by the Colombian judicial authorities in exercise of their
domestic jurisdiction within the territory of the Republic of
Colombia."32
Both Colombia and France invoked their right under Arti-
cle 124 of the Rome Statute to exempt their nationals from in-
vestigation by the ICC for Article 8 war crimes for a period of
seven years following ratification. 33 France also addresses sev-
eral specific issues arising under Article 8 with interpretative
declarations that one could easily envisage the United States
employing. One such interpretation relates to Article 8(2)(b)
and France's view that it "relates solely to conventional weap-
ons and does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons nor impair
the other rules of international law applicable to other weapons
necessary to the exercise by France of its inherent right of self-
defense. .... -34
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Colombia Declaration, C.N. 834.2002, Aug. 5, 2002, http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISHICNs?2002/801_900/834E.doc.
32 Id.
33 See id.; see France Declaration, C.N. 339.2002 (Apr. 11, 2002), http://un-
treaty.un.org.English?CNs/2002/301_400/339E.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
34 France Declaration, supra note 33.
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Some of the constitutional concerns raised by American
commentators could be addressed in a U.S. interpretative decla-
ration or, preferably, a proviso that need not be formally sub-
mitted with the instrument of ratification. Such a proviso could
express the U.S. intention that nothing in the Rome Statute re-
quires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United
States that is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted
by the United States. While this may prove controversial, it is
not uncommon in U.S. treaty practice and should mean very lit-
tle if anything to the cooperative relationship between the
United States and the ICC. 35
IV. CONCLUSION
Such proposals are not mission impossible. Neither do they
constitute a mission that the United States should forfeit or be
intimidated by. Such a multi-pronged initiative may not be pos-
sible for some time to come, but we always knew this would be a
long process, and I see every reason to keep dogging it until that
day when the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute is resurrected
and the United States finally joins the international court that
represents its highest values.
35 For example, such a proviso was required by the U.S. Senate in connection
with the U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2005); United States of America, Ratification, June 8, 1992,
1676 U.N.T.S. 543, 543, available at http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/
ChaptIV_4/reservations/USA.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). See also CARTER,
TRIMBLE, AND BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-178 (4th ed. 2003).
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